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Emily Slike 
 
 Tension has long existed between states and the federal oversight 
invoked throughout the western United States. While courts have clarified 
some, there are still questions about the oversight the federal government 
should be afforded. In Sturgeon v. Frost, the Supreme Court left the hard 
questions of state sovereignty and federal land management to the lower 
appellate courts. However, the Court ruled that Alaska will continue to 
remain the exception to the rule and that Alaskan conservation system 
units can be treated differently than other federally managed preservation 
land throughout the rest of the country.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The historical tension between federal and state control of 
federally managed preservation land continued when the United States 
Supreme Court examined how Alaska National Interest Lands and 
Conservation Act’s (“ANICLA”) affected the National Park Service’s 
(“NPS”) control of federal lands in Sturgeon v. Frost.1 The issue 
concerned Alaska resident John Sturgeon’s use of a hovercraft on an 
Alaskan river within a system unit, managed by the NPS, which bans 
hovercraft use.2 However, Alaska law permits activities that are important 
to Alaskans, including hovercraft use.3 Sturgeon argued that § 103(c) of 
ANICLA prohibited the NPS from regulating “non-public” land in Alaska 
because the Nation River is owned by Alaska through the Submerged 
Lands Act, which transferred title and ownership of submerged lands and 
waters to the state.4 The NPS argued that, under the reserved water rights 
doctrine, “it has title to an interest” within the Yukon-Charley Rivers 
National Preserve System Unit (“Yukon-Charley”) boundaries, a unit 
where the Nation River flows through.5  
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the 
NPS had the authority to enforce regulations over all federally-owned 
lands, waters, and national park navigable waterways administered by the 
NPS nationally.6 The Ninth Circuit held that because the hovercraft ban 
does not apply “solely” to the conservation system units in Alaska, the 
NPS retained authority  for hovercraft regulation enforcement.7 The 
Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded remaining questions 
                                                          
1.  136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016). 
2.  Id. at 1062. 
3.  Id. at 1066.  
4.  Id. at 1068 (citing Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
16 U.S.C.A. Ch. 51 (1980)).  
5.  Id. at 1063.  
6.  Id.  
7.  Id. at 1070. 
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regarding “public” and “non-public” lands and future management 
authority.8  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
  When the United States purchased Alaska in 1867, 98 percent of 
the state’s 365 million acres were federally owned, resulting in an absence 
of federal land grants to the State.9 In 1958, the Alaska Statehood Act 
allowed Alaska to choose 103 million acres of federal land to become 
state-owned allowing for maximum land use “consistent with public 
interest.”10 After failed attempts to secure additional acreage for state 
control, Congress passed ANICLA in 1980.11 ANICLA reserved 104 
million acres of land for preservation and specified that the NPS could not 
ban activities of particular importance to Alaskans on such lands.12 
ANICLA’s two goals were: (1) to allow for ample protection of Alaskan 
public land’s “scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values” and (2) 
to allow for opportunity and satisfaction of Alaska and its people’s 
economic and social needs.13 Under ANICLA, preserved lands were 
placed in “conservation system units” which included “any unit in Alaska 
of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System, National 
Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument.”14 
In the fall of 2007, Sturgeon was using his hovercraft for moose 
hunting on the Nation River when NPS Rangers told Sturgeon that 
hovercraft use in the Yukon-Charley was forbidden.15 Sturgeon protested, 
saying the regulation was not applicable because the river was State-
owned, but complied with the order to remove his hovercraft from the 
area.16 Apprehensive of criminal prosecution if he continued to use his 
hovercraft, Sturgeon sued the NPS and several officials in the United 
States District Court for the District of Alaska, with Alaska intervening in 
support of Sturgeon.17 Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
permitting the use of  hovercrafts within the Yukon-Charley boundaries.18 
Summary judgment was granted to the NPS, and the Ninth Circuit partially 
affirmed.19 
    Further examination of 54 U.S.C. § 100751 was required to 
determine if § 103(c) creates an exception to the NPS’s general authority.20 
                                                          
8.  Id. at 1071-72. 
9.  Id.  
10.  Id. (citing Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 1). 
11.  Id. at 1066.  
12.  Id. 
13.  Id.  
14.  Id.  
15.  Id. at 1066-67.  
16.  Id. at 1067.  
17.  Id.  
18.  Id.  
19.  Id.  
20.  Id.  
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First, the Court examined if § 103(c) addressed the extent of the Park 
Service’s authority over lands within the boundaries of conservation 
system units in Alaska.21 The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to 
recommend regulations regarding “boating and other activities on or 
related to water located within System units, including water subject to 
United States jurisdiction.”22 System units are “any area of land and water 
administered by the Secretary, acting through the Director of the NPS, for 
park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”23 The 
hovercraft ban was adopted under 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) and has effect 
throughout all federally controlled preservation areas.24 Section 103(c) 
provides that “only lands, waters, and interests therein to which the United 
States has title are considered public land included as a portion of the 
Alaska conservation system units.” 25 
Sturgeon, relying on federal land management history, asserted 
that the NPS was prohibited from regulating “non-public” land as if the 
land was federally owned.26 The first part of Sturgeon’s argument was that 
the Nation River is owned by Alaska and therefore cannot be “public” 
land.27 The second prong of Sturgeon’s argument was that the Nation 
River is not part of the Yukon-Charley, therefore the NPS lacks regulation 
authority due to  § 103(c)’s second sentence that states no lands conveyed 
by Alaska… “before, on, or after December 2, 1980 shall be subject to the 
regulations applicable solely to public lands within the units.”28 Sturgeon’s  
argument concluded that because the hovercraft ban is a regulation over 
federally controlled preservation areas, and not a generally applicable law, 
the NPS cannot enforce the ban.29  
The NPS argued its longstanding authority to regulate waters 
within federally managed preservation areas, and that § 103(c) does not 
remove that authority.30 The NPS maintained that the United States has 
title to an interest in the water within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley 
under the reserved water rights doctrine.31 The doctrine states that when 
the federal government removes land from public domain to reserve it for 
a federal purpose, it reserves then unappropriated water needed to 
accomplish the reservation’s purpose.32 The NPS concluded its argument 
stating that the regulation is not solely for public lands, so the ban’s 
enforcement is not prevented.33 
                                                          
21.  Id.  
22.  Id. (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) (2014)).  
23.  Id.  
24.  Id.  
25.  Id.  
26.  Id. at 1068.  
27.  Id.  
28.  Id.  
29.  Id. at 1069. 
30.  Id.   
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 96 S. Ct. 
2062, 48 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1976)).  
33.  Id.   
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The Ninth Circuit adopted its own interpretation of § 103(c), 
determining the phrase “regulations applicable solely to public lands 
within such units” differentiates between the NPS regulations applying 
solely to public lands in Alaska, and the NPS regulations applying to 
federally managed preservation areas across the country.34 The court 
further reasoned that the NPS could enforce nationally applicable 
regulations on “public” and “non-public” property within Alaska’s system 
boundaries because the regulations do not only apply to public lands 
within the units.35 Additionally, the NPS may not apply Alaska-specific 
regulations to “non-public” lands within the boundaries of the units.36 In 
sum, because the hovercraft ban applies to all lands administered by the 
NPS, and all navigable waters lying within National Parks, the hovercraft 
ban is not solely applicable to the Alaskan units.37 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the NPS authority exists to enforce the hovercraft ban.38 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s § 103(c) 
interpretation, and found the view inconsistent with ANICLA’s text and 
context as a whole.39 The Court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s reading 
which seemed “plausible in the abstract,” but not in reality.40 The Court 
discussed how ANICLA creates many exceptions, specific to Alaska, to 
the NPS’s general authority over federally controlled preservation areas.41 
Of these, the most applicable exception outlines that “National Preserves 
‘in Alaska shall be administered and managed as a unit of the National 
Park System in the same manner as a national park except as otherwise 
provided in this Act and except that the taking of fish and wildlife for sport 
purposes and subsistence uses, and trapping shall be allowed’ pursuant to 
applicable law.”42  
The Court continued to recognize that Alaska is “often the 
exception, not the rule,” and found the Ninth Circuit’s reading prevented 
the NPS from recognizing Alaska’s uniqueness.43 Under the Ninth 
Circuit’s “topsy-turvy” reading, the NPS could regulate “non-public” 
lands in Alaska only by rules valid outside of Alaska.44     
Additionally, § 103(c) distinguishes “non-public” and “public” 
lands within system units.45 If the Ninth Circuit’s reading was followed, 
                                                          
34.  Id. at 1069-70.  
35.  Id. at 1070.  
36.  Id.   
37.  Id. (emphasis added). 
38.  Id.  
39.  Id.  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id.  
42.  Id. at 1071 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (1980)).  
43.  Id. 
44.  Id.  
45.  Id.  
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in differentiating between “public” and “non-public” land the NPS would 
have to regulate “non-public” land by rules enforced outside Alaska, and 
“public” lands following Alaska-specific provisions.46 If the NPS had 
authority over “non-public” Alaska lands, an implausible reading of § 
103(c) arises.47 When the Court examined ANICLA with special 
consideration given to § 103(c), it considered the possibility of all 
conservation unit land being treated differently than other federally 
controlled preservation areas.48 The Court additionally contemplated that 
within the boundaries “non-public” and “public” lands may be treated 
differently.49 Because Alaskan system lands could not be treated 
differently, and managing “public” and “non-public” lands within the units 
would require further measures, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s  
§ 103(c) interpretation, vacated the judgement, and remanded the 
remaining issues.50   
The arguments not inspected by the Court included: (1) deciding 
if the Nation River is “public” land under ANICLA because the issue 
touches on vital state sovereignty and federal authority issues, (2) deciding 
if the NPS has authority under 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) to regulate 
Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation River, even if the river is not 
determined to be “public” land, or if ANICLA limits the NPS’s authority, 
and (3) NPS’s alternative argument that under ANICLA it has authority 
over “public” and “non-public” lands within Alaskan unit areas, to the 
extent a regulation is written applying specifically to both kinds of land. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The outcome in Sturgeon can be viewed as a victory for Alaska’s 
uniqueness regarding federal management of preservation areas. But this 
victory is dampened by the Court’s refusal to address issues regarding the 
classification of “public” and “non-public” lands within system units, 
leaving questions about federal management and the NPS’s authority over 
such lands unknown. While the Court once again established the 
individuality of Alaska’s land, large questions concerning the battle 
between state sovereignty and federal management will not be answered 
until a decision by the Ninth Circuit further clarifies the issues between 
state and federal land management. 
                                                          
46.  Id.  
47.  Id.  
48.  Id.  
49.  Id.  
50.  Id. at 1071-72.  
